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CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT: A
REPLY TO RUBENFELD
Christopher L. Eisgruber
Professors Flaherty, Fleming, Greene, and Rubenfeld have offered
insightful comments and criticisms regarding my book, Constitutional
Self-Government.1 I am grateful to them for their essays and to the
Fordham Law Review for putting together this symposium.
In this brief reply, I take up to two arguments that, if not addressed,
might leave readers with a mistaken impression of my views. It is
tempting, of course, to answer other points made by my critics, but I
have already had my say at some length-not only in Constitutional
Self-Government, but in my essay here2 and in a lengthy "Reply to
Critics" published in the University of San Francisco Law Review.3
My efforts to improve upon those arguments will have to await
another day, when I might at least muster fresh formulations, if not
better ideas.
I. A MEANINGLESS ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?
Early in his essay, Jed Rubenfeld contends that my theory allows
judges-and Americans more generally-to ignore constitutional
commitments with which they disagree. By way of example, he
imagines a "federal statute that establishes Christianity as the national
religion."4 He supposes that, if "the statute accurately reflects the
moral judgment of living Americans,"5 then my theory would direct
the Supreme Court to uphold it, regardless of its apparent
inconsistency with the plain text of the Establishment Clause.
This argument misrepresents my position. My theory does not
license judges or other Americans to ignore constitutional provisions
with which they disagree. Instead, my theory maintains that "the
Constitution calls upon Americans to exercise their own best
judgment about the principles it incorporates."6 Hence, Americans
1. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001).
2. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dimensions of Democracy, 71 Fordham L. Rev.
1723 (2003).
3. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government and Judicial
Review: A Reply to Five Critics, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 115 (2002).
4. Jed Rubenfeld, Of Constitutional Self-Government, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1749,
1751-52 (2003).
5. Id. at 1752.
6. Eisgruber, supra note 1, at 42.
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must make their own judgments about what counts as an
"establishment of religion." They need not (and, indeed, ought not)
defer to the framers' opinions about what counted as an
"establishment." But though their interpretations will be sensitive to
their (changing) convictions about justice, Americans must
nevertheless offer interpretations of the concept of "establishment."
They cannot ignore that concept in favor of some more abstract
concept, such as "justice," even if, per Rubenfeld's hypothesis, they
now believe that established religion is a good thing.7
In this regard, Americans are in the same position as Sonny, the
promisor whom I describe at length in Constitutional Self-Government
and "Dimensions of Democracy. ' Sonny promises Gramps that he
will eat only healthy foods. What should Sonny do if he later comes
to believe that Gramps was mistaken about which foods are healthy?
In my view, it is possible for Sonny to honor his promise by using his
own judgment about which foods are in fact healthy. Sonny may, in
other words, reject Gramps's mistaken applications of the concept of
"healthy." But Sonny is nevertheless bound to produce judgments of
what foods are "healthy," not what foods are "delicious" or
"desirable." He is bound, in other words, to respect the meaning of
the concept "healthy."9  He cannot substitute a different concept
simply because he now desires to eat unhealthy foods or because
there is durable debate about which foods are healthy.
Of course, it is possible that Sonny will endorse foolish theories
about what is "healthy." He might sincerely believe, for example, that
all brown mushrooms are healthy. If so, he might eat poisonous ones
and get dreadfully ill. Likewise, it is imaginable that, in the distant
future, Americans might develop strange beliefs about what counts as
an "establishment." Those beliefs might lead them to conclude that
Congress could create a national church without thereby making a
"law respecting an Establishment of religion." This turn of events
would be highly peculiar, and, admittedly, my theory would put no
obstacles in its path. But the peculiarities here are not a consequence
of my theory. They are instead a consequence of the wild views that
we have attributed to future generations. It is possible to produce
equally zany results under other theories by attributing comparably
zany opinions to future Americans. For example, under Rubenfeld's
7. 1 have stressed that Americans must honor constitutional rules "even if they
think [them] inconsistent with basic principles of justice." Eisgruber, supra note 1, at
10. If, however, Americans regard a provision as unjust, they should give it "the
narrowest construction consistent with [its] plain language." Id. at 125.
8. Id., at 29-32; Eisgruber, supra note 2, at 1746-47.
9. The distinction between "application" and "meaning" is from Mark D.
Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 Geo. L.J. 569, 586-
91 (1998).
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theory, one can produce funny results by endowing hypothetical
Americans with frivolous beliefs about "paradigm cases.""
There is a more general point at stake here. Rubenfeld rightly
believes that my theory is more "present-oriented"'" than his own, but
he mistakes the nature of the difference. He supposes that my theory
is present-oriented because it denies that the Constitution imposes
any binding commitments upon us. That is not so. My theory
recognizes that the Constitution imposes binding commitments that
may be inconsistent with our current judgments about justice. My
view is nevertheless present-oriented because it justifies those
commitments on the basis of their capacity to enable Americans to
govern themselves on the basis of their own (current) judgments
about justice. Thus I emphasize that the Constitution's specific rules
not only constrain Americans but also create structures that facilitate
democratic political action. 2 I also argue that we should welcome the
abstract, open-textured character of many constitutional clauses,
including the Establishment Clause, that make the Constitution
permeable to changing moral and political judgments. 3
This account of constitutionalism is pragmatic and partly empirical.
In practice, the Constitution might impair rather than enhance self-
government. For example, if, as Rubenfeld asks us to assume,
Americans believed that an established church were consistent with
the demands of justice, then the Establishment Clause would stand in
the way of democracy. This observation strikes me as
uncontroversial, but, oddly enough, Rubenfeld seems to hold almost
exactly the opposite view. His theory invites, if it does not compel,
the conclusion that the Constitution is most democratic when it
collides with present judgments about justice, because, according to
Rubenfeld, the point of the Constitution is to ensure that Americans
honor their temporally extended identities rather than their present-
day judgments about justice. 4 This strikes me as an implausible view
of democracy, and that is the heart of my disagreement with
Rubenfeld: we disagree, in other words, about how-and under what
circumstances-a binding Establishment Clause promotes democracy,
not about whether the Establishment Clause is binding.
II. DELEGATION TO THE PHILOSOPHER DEANS?
At the conclusion of his essay, Rubenfeld asks us to imagine a law
review staff that disagrees about what sorts of articles to publish. A
council of deans seizes control of the process. The deans assert,
10. For discussion of Rubenfeld's theory of paradigm cases, see Eisgruber, supra
note 2, at 1744-46.
11. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1754.
12. Eisgruber, supra note 1, at 12-18.
13. Id. at 25, 39.
14. For discussion of this point, see Eisgruber, supra note 2, at 1745-46.
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among other things, that the question about what articles to publish is
a moral question; that the students' judgments are likely to be tainted
by self-interest; and that the deans themselves are more disinterested.
Rubenfeld suggests that, on my theory, the deans are no different
from Supreme Court Justices and hence their control of the law
review should count as democratic. This result, says Rubenfeld, is
absurd, and hence my theory must be wrong. 5
The result would indeed be absurd but my theory does not produce
it. Viewed through the prism of my theory, Rubenfeld's deans are
nothing like Supreme Court justices. My case for judicial review
depends upon institutional features of large-scale electoral processes
and American courts. I argue that voters in large-scale elections have
little incentive to deliberate about or take full moral responsibility for
their choices, and that they are free to vote upon the basis of their
self-interest. I then argue that American-style judicial review might
help to for the non-deliberative characteristics of large-scale elections.
Judges combine a democratic pedigree with disinterestedness. By
virtue of their disinterestedness, they are likely to decide moral issues
on the basis of the right kind of reasons (moral reasons). By virtue of
their democratic pedigree, their moral reasons are likely to have
popular appeal, in the sense of being embedded within the people's
ongoing discussion about justice. As such, judges may help to
represent the people with regard to moral issues.
None of these institutional features appear in Rubenfeld's
hypothetical. The staff of Rubenfeld's hypothetical law review is
small enough to practice face-to-face democracy; hence the incentives
of large-scale elections do not apply. Rubenfeld's hypothetical thus
omits the problem to which judicial review is a solution. It also omits
both of the features that make judicial review a plausible corrective to
that problem. First, the deans lack a democratic pedigree: they are
not appointed by the students on the review. Second, although
Rubenfeld stipulates that the students' judgments may be tainted by
self-interest, this stipulation makes little sense. It seems more likely
that the deans' judgment will be tainted by self-interest, because the
law review's policy may affect their ability (and the ability of their
friends) to publish in it. In any event, there is no good reason to
suppose that the deans' judgment will be less self-interested than the
students.
More generally, Rubenfeld's argument neglects the institutional
character of my case in favor of judicial review. In particular,
Rubenfeld seems to assume that my theory derives judicial review
directly from its critique of majoritarianism. That is not so. I do
regard majoritarian accounts of democracy as defective, and I believe
that those defects are crucial to understanding the pro-democratic
15. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1764-65.
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functions of super-majoritarian amendment rules. However, my
defense of judicial review depends principally on claims about the
institutional characteristics of courts, legislatures, and large-scale
elections. 6 Nowhere do I claim that my critique of majoritarianism is
sufficient to establish the desirability of judicial review. On the
contrary, I acknowledge that it is an empirical question whether other
institutions could implement my preferred, non-majoritarian
conception of democracy as well as, or better than, judicial review
does. Nor, for that matter, is my critique of majoritarianism necessary
to my case for judicial review. 7 As I point out in Constitutional Self-
Government, a majoritarian democrat who accepts my analysis of
electoral and judicial institutions might endorse judicial review as the
best means to implement a majoritarian form of democracy. 8
Rubenfeld's interpretation of my argument replicates a problematic
feature of his own theory. As I point out in "Dimensions of
Democracy," Rubenfeld attempts to justify constitutionalism and
judicial review directly from moral principles about the meaning of
democracy, without making any pragmatic, empirical claims about
institutional competence. He argues, in particular, that constitutions
and judicial review are the only ways in which a people may give itself
principles over time.19 He seems to attribute to me an argument of
roughly the same form-namely, that a polity can satisfy the
requirements of non-majoritarian democracy if and only if it favors
some form of judicial review over legislative supremacy. As I
indicated in "Dimensions of Democracy," I am skeptical about
whether an argument of this form can succeed. It is certainly not the
kind of argument I made in Constitutional Self-Government, where
my emphasis (rightly or wrongly) is on the incentives that attach to
particular institutions, all of which are imperfect devices for
implementing democracy.
16. In fact, when I summarize my argument regarding judicial review in
Constitutional Self-Government, the summary is all about institutional incentives, and
makes no mention of majority rule or its deficiencies. Eisgruber, supra note 1, at 71,
77-78.
17. My critique of majoritarianism is much more important to my defense of
super-majoritarian amendment rules than to my account of judicial review. Id. at 18-
20, 44.
18. Id. at 72.
19. Eisgruber, supra note 2, at 1737-38.
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